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tention to the vertical subordination of the
mind to the impersonal constraints that are
the mark of the social (top-down). To me,
the interactive approach should address the
theoretical articulation of these different
stances as well as the way they can be practically switched in situations. This would certainly help clarify the ambiguous nature of
the second person, which oscillates between
an ontological claim about the interactive
nature of social phenomena, a phenomenological statement about the human mode
of engaging with the world, and an epistemological contention about the explanatory
power of interactions.
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> Abstract • The commentaries on my

target article tend to be either supportive and expansive or corrective. I respond
to these commentaries by focusing on
issues that involve philosophical and
scientific frameworks, concepts of autonomy, self, and social cognition broadly
conceived.
« 1 » First, let me thank all of the commenters for their careful readings of my article and for their criticisms and suggestions. I
take many of the comments to be either supportive, or corrective, or expansive of what I
have argued in the target article. For example, I find very little to disagree with in Étienne Bimbenet’s expansive comment in which
he suggests that we all keep our heads even
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as we emphasize the embodied and enactive
roots of cognition. He is surely right that enactivists have to do a better job in explaining
how basic perceptual and action-oriented
processes translate into the more complex
types of cognitive performance. Likewise
Mathieu Arminjon’s commentary suggests that
we need to expand the enactivist account to
consider not just cognition, but broader social-political themes. Ema Demšar and Urban
Kordeš want to broaden the constructivist
scope to include predictive processing in a
way that is consistent with enactivism. Hubert Wykretowicz, in a more corrective mode,
suggests that in regard to the notion of self,
we need to adjust the focus so that we are
able to characterize a richer phenomenology
of the person. Both Laurence Kaufmann and
Ahmad Abu-Akel propose to enrich the enactivist account of social cognition: Abu-Akel by
constructing a hybrid that brings theoretical
inference and simulation back into play, and
Kaufman by emphasizing the importance of
third-person processes in the social and
institutional factors that constrain intersubjective interactions. Rather than responding
to each commenter in turn, I will organize
my response in terms of the issues or themes
that the commentaries highlight.

Searle J. (2001) Rationality in action. MIT Press,
Cambridge MA.
Simmel G. (1999) Sociologie: Etudes sur les
formes de la socialisation. PUF, Paris. German original published in 1908.
Professor of sociology at the University of Lausanne
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en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, Laurence
Kaufmann works in an interdisciplinary manner
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first-person authority, social cognition and
collective intentionality. Her main interests concern the
ontology of social phenomena from a sociological and
historical point of view – how institutions emerge and
change over time – as well as from a philosophical
and psychological perspective – what human abilities
are necessary to constitute and maintain institutions.
http://www.unil.ch/unisciences/LaurenceKaufmann
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Philosophical and scientific
frameworks

« 2 » Demšar & Kordeš point out the affinity of enactivism, predictive processing (PP),
and constructivism. In this regard, they affirm two principles: first, that knowledge of
the world is actively constructed; and second, that the “function of cognitive systems
is to adaptively guide behavior (rather than
to veridically recover ‘reality’)” (§4). The
first principle is consistent primarily with
PP, especially in those versions of PP that
emphasize ongoing construction of a generative model in a way that makes active inference serve prediction error minimization
(e.g., Hohwy 2013), and the second one is
primarily a principle of enactivism. Indeed,
enactivism would treat that first principle as
a corollary to the second one by reconceiving active inference as a form of pragmatic
engagement. Enactivism would say (echoing
a Marxist slogan): “The real point is not to
construct the world but to engage with it.”
Enactivism resists the type of description
that one can find in some versions of PP
– that the cognitive system is simply sampling or testing the environment in order to
identify what is out there. Andy Clark, for
example, suggests that active inference is
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about “sampling the world in ways designed
to test our hypotheses” (Clark 2016: 7, 290;
also see the quotation of Clark in Demšar &
Kordeš §3). He moves towards a more enactivist view (and the second constructionist
principle) only when he adds that we sample
the world “to yield better information for
the control of action itself ” (ibid).
« 3 » I am in agreement that some version of PP can be integrated with enactivism
(Demšar & Kordeš cite the relevant literature
in this regard, §19), specifically in regard to
the kinship of the free-energy principle and
autopoiesis (Bitbol & Gallagher 2018). As
Demšar & Kordeš make clear, it is important
to pick the right metaphors and the right
vocabulary, or perhaps we should just say a
productive metaphor and a vocabulary that
does not mislead us. This is related to what
Demšar & Kordeš refer to as Q1: “how would
the traditionally neurocentric study of the
brain – and more broadly, of the mind – go
about incorporating perspectives that emphatically oppose the narrow neurocentric
view?” (§13). The short answer is that it cannot, unless through some Hegelian dialectic
where negation transforms to a positive (as
Zaslawski 2018 argues in this issue). Short
of that, we do need alternative vocabularies and an open-mindedness that allows for
a rethinking of the mind and a new understanding of how the brain works. But I would
also argue that Q1 is too general; the best we
can do is look at specific areas and try to understand how brain, body, and environment
work together to do what they do.

Agency and autonomy

« 4 » Both Bimbenet and Arminjon raise
questions about agency and autonomy. Bimbenet characterizes my analysis as drawing
a line between natural motor control processes and normative (social and linguistic)
aspects of autonomy. Kaufmann makes a neat
summary of this point (§2). I do claim, in
response to the Libet experiments, that motor control should not be confused with free
will, but I do not intend to draw a heavy line
between these realms since I take motor capacities to be enabling conditions for autonomy, which precisely do not float freely in
the air, but are tied to context. Accordingly,
I agree with Bimbenet’s emphasis on the role
of communicative and social practices for
the constitution of autonomy, precisely un-
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derstood as relational autonomy. He wants
(and he wants me) to think more deeply and
further about such things; at the same time
he points to my own attempts to emphasize
the “social thing” (§7; Bimbenet has quotation marks around that phrase but I do not
know whether it is my phrase or his own).
Indeed, we can look further along a number of different lines by considering conceptions such as the socially extended mind or
what I have termed “mental institutions”
(Gallagher 2013a), where examples such as
legal institutions or the institutions of science (Slaby & Gallagher 2015) structure our
complex cognitive accomplishments and
our intersubjective interactions, and thereby
add to or subtract from the autonomy of our
actions.
« 5 » Furthermore, Bimbenet, in framing his more general challenge concerning
more complex forms of cognition, and in
mentioning that imitation, joint attention,
artifacts and socially formed habits can also
play roles in enabling or constraining autonomy, marks out areas where there already
is ongoing work by embodied and enactive
theorists. Lambros Malafouris’s (2013) material engagement theory (MET), for example, is just such an attempt to show how the
material aspects of cultural practices have a
profound effect on how we think and solve
problems. Likewise, one can find ongoing
research on learning, imitation and “natural
pedagogy” (Csibra & Gergely 2009), as well
as on the role of narrative in collective intentionality (Tollefsen & Gallagher 2017), all
of which extend the enactivist analysis. Explaining complex forms of cognition is indeed an important challenge for enactivism
but recent work on imagination, memory,
problem solving, language, mathematical
cognition and the idea of embodied rationality in authors such as Daniel Hutto and
Erik Myin (2017), and Ezequiel Di Paolo,
Elena Cuffari and Hanne de Jaegher (2018)
suggest that enactivist approaches potentially have what it takes to work out explanations of more complex forms of cognition.
In this respect, to answer Bimbenet’s question
about whether I agree with Hubert Dreyfus’s
demarcation between basic “mindless” performance and the “upper floor of linguistic
and conceptual knowledge” (§2), I have
been pursuing the idea that there is more
continuity than discontinuity (Gallagher

2017: Ch. 10). Both disembodied cognition
and decapitated cognition are myths.
« 6 » Arminjon, like Bimbenet, focuses
on autonomy and agency, but suggests that
enactivism needs to go beyond questions
about cognition to address the social and
political complexities that form the context
of human life. He wants more detail about
what he calls my “apartheid and slavery”
hypothesis (which I mention in §27 of the
target article). Elsewhere (Gallagher 2013b)
I explain that the example comes from my
daughter’s experience in the Peace Corps
in South Africa. Working in a small village
outside of Pretoria she was attempting to
convince the villagers to help themselves
by taking constructive action in the form
of growing some of their own food. The response, as she reports it, was laughter. The
villagers explained that what she proposed
was impossible and that she simply did not
understand. The reason, according to the
villagers, was because they were lazy. Under
the regime of apartheid this is what they had
been told and had been raised to believe.
Their internalization of that message, as
part of their own self-consciousness, basically meant that they were robbed of their
autonomy by the social-political structures
that had been part of apartheid. As Kaufmann
suggests, “Little by little, individuals make
the status of responsible subject ascribed to
them by others their own and adopt the social norms of reasonableness and accountability with regard to themselves” (§3) – yes,
but only if others ascribe such norms, and
for some populations it is all too “little by
little.”
« 7 » Arminjon points to important work
on “social epidemiology” as it relates to
the African-American population in the
United States. In this case the story is about
the prevalence of arterial hypertension in a
population that has been oppressed. Social
structure that can rob a people of autonomy can also have profound bodily effects,
as research by Nancy Krieger and Stephen
Sidney (1996) demonstrates, and can shape
not only a person’s self-consciousness, but
non-conscious behaviors, or as Arminjon puts
it, produces a “physiological habitus” that
can limit agency (§§6f). As Arminjon points
out, this is an extremely good example of
how social and political forces relate to embodiment, beyond the narrow confines of
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cognition. With respect to the physiological
aspects of habitus, I can point to the recent
work I cited in my article on the role of affect (broadly conceived to include hunger,
fatigue, and other physiologically based
processes that constitute the physiological
habitus) in constraining cognition, behavior,
and social interaction (e.g., Colombetti 2014
Bower & Gallagher 2013). With specific reference to how embodied-enactivist accounts
can address social and political issues, Axel
Honneth (2008) shows that an understanding of primary and secondary intersubjectivity has direct relevance to basic notions
of autonomy, recognition, and justice,1 and I
suspect that Arminjon and I would be in general agreement about this.

A complicated phenomenology
of the self and other

« 8 » Questions about agency and autonomy, as both Arminjon and Bimbenet are
aware, are directly related to questions about
self and our relations with others. With respect to the notion of self, Wykretowicz offers a critical perspective on the notion of
self-pattern, concerned primarily about
the phenomenological unity of the self. We
agree that the self is not something that is
reducible to neuronal patterns, but Wykretowicz worries about the unity of subjective
life. He is right to suggest that for me the
unity of self-experience is in some way tied
to what I have called the minimal self (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012), or what I call here
the minimal experiential aspect (or sometimes just the “experiential aspect”) of the
self-pattern (Gallagher & Daly 2018). There
is an ambiguity to this aspect insofar as in
some respects it is both an abstraction (there
is no such thing just on its own – it always
involves a temporally extended context and
is always related to other aspects of the selfpattern) and something that is very concrete
(insofar as it is constituted by first-person
perspectival and fully embodied proprioceptive/kinaesthetic experiences of ownership and agency). This experiential aspect is
itself a pattern within a larger pattern, and
I have characterized such a pattern as a dynamical gestalt. It is dynamical in the sense
1 | I discuss Honneth’s analysis in my forthcoming book, Action and Interaction (Oxford
University Press).

that the dynamical relations that tie the different aspects of the self-pattern together
constitute its unity. And it is a gestalt in the
sense defined by Kurt Goldstein:
Although the normal person’s behaviour is
“prevailingly
concrete, this concreteness can be
considered normal only as long as it is embedded
in and codetermined by the abstract attitude. For
instance, in the normal person both attitudes are
always present in a definite figure-ground relation. (Goldstein & Scheerer 1964: 8)
« 9 » The various elements of the selfpattern are not, as Wykretowicz (§3) suggests,
organized on different levels around a minimal core. As a dynamical gestalt the pattern
is not characterized by different levels, but
by an integration via dynamical relations
(Gallagher & Daly 2018). In effect, the unity
of the self just is the coherency of the pattern held together in its dynamical relations.
Accordingly, I reject the metaphor of core
and hinge, and I suggest that the notion of
dynamical integration makes the question of
phenomenology more complicated.
« 10 » The phenomenology of the self
goes beyond the pre-reflective minimal experiential aspect since there are also reflective experiences, and variations of experience associated with affect, intersubjectivity,
memory, narrative, etc. Although this is a
complicated phenomenology, I agree with
Wykretowicz that Husserl offers an important take on it. Furthermore, the notion of
habitus can apply not just to the minimal
experiential aspect, and not just to cognitive capacities, but to a significant number
of elements in the self-pattern, including,
as Wykretowicz (§9) suggests, affective and
practical processes, dispositions, tendencies,
and skills (§11). To be clear, once we jettison
the metaphors of core and hinge, I can agree
with most of the rest of Wykretowicz’s analysis and with the usefulness of the concept of
habitus. Along with what Arminjon calls the
“physiological habitus” we are bound to find
a phenomenological habitus.
« 11 » More precisely, the habitus is both
physiological and phenomenological, and
always socially contextualized in ways that
include relations between self and others. As
Martin Heidegger (1962) might put it, Dasein is Mitsein all the way up and all the way
down. That is the case even before a child

starts to conceive of other minds, or comes
to the possibility of using theoretical inference or simulation to mindread. This is not
to deny that we may learn to think about
other minds in ways that lead us to situations in which, as Abu-Akel suggests (§2) appeal to some “explicit symbolic theory” or
to a simulation process is possible. Abu-Akel
favors the empirical rather than the innate
versions of TT and ST and suggests that
some hybrid version of these approaches
comes close to (or perhaps may be integrated with) interaction theory. This kind of
proposal certainly has been made to seem
more feasible since the experiments showing that even 13-month-old infants (and
perhaps even younger infants) are seemingly able to pass spontaneous false-belief
tests (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott & Zijing 2010).
It is not clear to me, however, that there is,
as Abu-Akel suggests, “a shift from an indexical- to a symbolic-based world of mental
state representation” that maps onto the
shift from primary to secondary intersubjectivity (§3). Even within the framework
of secondary intersubjectivity (which starts
around 9–12 months with joint attention),
when young infants seem capable of passing
the spontaneous false-belief tests, it is not
clear that we have a symbolic-based inference process that amounts to mindreading
(Gallagher & Povinelli 2012). This is part of
a much larger debate that I cannot hope to
rehearse here, but at the very least we can
note that Abu-Akel’s suggestion does not even
align with his own research, which shows
symbolic processing appearing only around
five years of age, and certainly not as early
as 13 months (Abu-Akel & Bailey 2001). In
any case, this is a serious challenge for TT
accounts.
« 12 » We should, of course, be clear
about what the evidence shows. Abu-Akel
cites Marc Jeannerod (1999) in regard to
the claim that mirror neurons (MNs) make
no distinction between self and other. This
is part of the original MN doctrine, but the
original data on MNs show that firing rates
of these neurons are different for action
mode (when I am acting) versus observation mode (when I am perceiving the actions of others). Jeannerod also points out
that there are differential overlaps of neuronal patterns that allow for the self-other
distinction (Georgieff & Jeannerod 1998).
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In addition, there are temporal and connection differences: activation prior to action
and integrated with efferent signals for my
action, versus activation after action unaccompanied by efferent signals, for observed
action. This is consistent with other empirical evidence against the matching hypothesis that is central to ST, that is, that MNs
are activated in such a way that activation
for observation necessarily matches activation for action (see e.g., Catmur, Walsh &
Heyes 2007). Pierre Jacob’s (2002) critique
of the simulation idea that MNs are oriented
toward the just-past observed action (attempting to match it) is consistent with the
enactivist interpretation of MN activation,
namely, that it is part of action preparation,
oriented to one’s future response to the other
person’s action. In any case, this is a challenge for ST.
« 13 » The studies of congenital heart
disease cited by Abu-Akel are fascinating. As
he suggests, the problems with third-person
(symbolic) social interactions in such cases
may be due to social-environmental and affective factors; this reinforces the idea that
the habitus is integratively physiological,
phenomenological, and social. This kind of
integration is also relevant to the point that
Kaufmann makes. Although one can clearly
distinguish between first-person and thirdperson perspectives, it is not always clear
that the second-person stance behaves itself
in an orderly way. My interactive stance towards the other person is both a first-person
and second-person stance at the same time.
First-person since I experience the other
from my unique perspective, and secondperson in two senses. First, I am facing the
other as an other (i.e., where, mutually, I am
other to her, and she is other to me). This
is described by Edmund Husserl (1964)
as a pairing (Paarung), and by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (2012) as an intercorporeity. Second, this facing towards the other is
already permeated by a normativity that is
not initiated by either of us. We inherit or
are born into a social milieu that starts to
shape our experience from the very beginning. Which means that the first-person
perspective is already second-person – my
experience is already influenced by my social milieu – by the social institutions and
cultural practices that contribute to what my
world is, and how I perceive it. So, there is
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a second-person face-to-face, and there is a
second-person a tergo, something operating
behind our backs that most often we are not
aware of, and that sometimes, in the form of
institutions, seems impersonal rather than
second-personal.
« 14 » We can study all of this from a
third-person perspective, which allows us to
capture some of it. We can adopt a scientific
view and ask, for example, what precisely are
these social institutions and cultural practices doing to us (perhaps, “little by little”) and
how do they shape our social interactions?
This third-person perspective is made possible by a lot of second-person interactions,
since science itself is a social institution that
heavily relies on second-person interactions, and it too shapes our first-person experience to the extent that we are scientists,
or are influenced in our thinking by science.
I take this to be what Kaufmann means when
she says, “the ontological seat of the firstperson stance, once ‘decentered’ from the
skull, is nothing but ‘second-person interactions’” (§1).
« 15 » Kaufmann raises a number of concerns. First, she is worried that I reject “the
social” as a specific ontological domain (§4).
What she means is that there is “a specific
domain of reasoning dedicated to social
entities” (§4), and apparently, I ignore this.
This is a conception of the social domain
that emphasizes “the early-developing deontic expectations” that configure social
relations. It is correct that I do not address
this in the target article, but that is due to
of a lack of space more than a lack of interest. And even here I can only point to other
places where I have discussed such issues
(Gallagher 2013a; Gallagher & Miyahara
2012), but also in Gallagher and Anthony
Crisafi (2009), which Kaufmann cites. My
sense is that we are very much aligned on
such issues.
« 16 » I strongly endorse Kaufmann’s
thinking about what she calls “deontic affordances.” Extending the concept of affordances to include social affordances
(already a concept in Gibson) and cultural
affordances (Ramstead, Veissière & Kirmayer 2016), has been a recent development
for enactivist theorists (see, e.g., Rietveld &
Kiverstein 2014; Gallagher 2018). Likewise,
I agree with Kaufmann’s discussion of “triadic configurations” and the “One-mode,”

and that they are not reducible to dyadic
intersubjective interactions. At the same
time, however, I reject the claim that such
interactions are “practically irrelevant” (§6).
Indeed, within the structures of impersonal
institutions or “One-mode” phenomena,
intersubjective interaction is sometimes the
only thing we have from which to develop
resistance, or at least to build resilience. I
would say something similar for narratives,
although I agree that they can do only part
of the job. If narratives sometimes support
the status quo, as Jürgen Habermas (1987,
131) suggests, they also have critical potential since they also allow us to reconfigure
our way of thinking (Gallagher, forthcoming). Critical narratives allow us to see differently and to reconfigure the “we” (Tollefsen & Gallagher 2017).
« 17 » There are, indeed, distorted intersubjective, second-person interactions.
As Kaufmann suggests, these may be “closer
to third-person distanciation and objectivation” (§7). To be able to say precisely how
such socio-pathological relations work, and
how we can fix them, we need to know precisely how intersubjective interaction works.
Within the socio-political context, this type
of project is being pursued by Honneth
(2008), for example, in terms of the analysis
of “recognition.” Whether or not Honneth
gets this right (see Varga & Gallagher 2012),
it is clearly a critical analysis that depends
on understanding how intersubjective interaction works. That there are “semantic”
(I would prefer the term “normative” in this
context) dimensions that impinge on our everyday lifeworld is undeniable. Understanding how they work and how we can fix them
is a shared goal.
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